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World trade, particularly trade in manufactured goods, has, for the last two
decades grown more rapidly than output. The growth of manufactured exports
from developing countries has been particularly notable. Over the past decade
developing country exports of manufactured goods have increased more
rapidly than developed country exports and manufactured output and also
more rapidly than output of developed countries.
This extension of international specialization has made a significant con-
tribution to productivity growth, and hence to the growth of per capita output.
Movement, however, generates friction, and there are signs that this expansion
of international specialization and commerce is beginning to test the capacity
of the political-legal institutional mechanisms which have, to now, controlled
and directed this expansion of the world economy.
These new problems tend to have at their core questions of distribution.
Specialization affects the distribution of a country's income between different
economic classes and different factors of production. At the same time, West-
ern societies have displayed increasing concern with issues of equity. Because
"losers" are often a more identifiable and vocal constituency than "winners,"
there is more political pressure to resist the growth of international specializa-
tion than to accommodate it. As LDG export expansion is often based on rela-
tively abundant unskilled labor, the expansion of trade tends to put LDG
interests in direct conflict with those of lower-income groups in the DCs, and to
create the impression that the "new protectionism" in the industrial countries
is aimed primarily at imports from developing countries.
Moving from impressions to facts is difficult. The "old" form of protection,
tariffs, has a natural quantitative dimension, and thus one can measure di-
rectly changes in the overall level of tariff protection. But the "new" protec-
tion takes a multitude of forms, many of which seem to defy quantification."LESS THAN FAIR VALUE" 261
Studies of the "new protectionism" have tended in methodology to be tabu-
lations of policy actions which affect imports.
1 But even the development of
these information systems is a multidimensional problem. First, information
sources must be sought out, and this is made difficult by importing countries'
reluctance to reveal the details (or sometimes even the existence) of arrange-
ments to impede imports. At the conceptual level, it is difficult to quantify
the various forms of administrative protection, or even to decide which ad-
ministrative action actually constitutes protection. An IMF study [13], for ex-
ample, included countervailing duty and dumping cases in the tabulation of
protective actions, while a World Bank tabulation [15] excluded them.
PURPOSE OF THE PAPER
This paper is an attempt to analyze the incidence of "less than fair value"
(LFV) complaints and cases.
2 Included under this label are the subsidy and
countervailing duty cases. They are referred to as less than fair value cases be-
cause the trade practices they are intended to control involve, in legal terms,
the sale of products in the US market as less than their "fair value" — by vir-
tue of a government export subsidy in countervailing duty cases, or of a
"private export subsidy" in a dumping case.
In the past several years, the less than fair value procedures have grown in
importance relative to escape clause procedures — since January 1975 over 225
less than fair value petitions but only 40 escape clause cases. The increased
resort to such mechanisms has led to a growing concern that protectionist
interests within industrial countries will exploit such administrative practices so
as to restrict significantly the expansion of world trade, particularly the ex-
pansion of manufactured exports by the developed countries (see, for example,
[12]). The number of LFV cases involving Latin-American exports has not
been large. These cases have, however, received considerable political and
news media attention — the recent "Mexican winter vegetables" antidumping
case is a good example.
LESS THAN FAIR VALUE CASES AND PROTECTION
As already noted, lists of recent protectionist measures sometimes include
and sometimes exclude LFV cases. Hence there is disagreement as to whether
or not they constitute protectionism.
Nature of the Coses
Dumping
The legal purpose of the antidumping act
3 is to prevent foreign firms and
individuals from selling in the US at prices lower than those they charge in
their home market. The US law provides that if home market sales are too
small to provide a basis for comparison with prices charged in the US market,262 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
sales in a third-country market may be used. It also provides that if it is de-
termined that the price charged in the home and in the US market is below
the firm's long-run cost of production, then in the dumping determination, that
is, the determination of the difference between the price charged in the US
and the "foreign market value," the administering US government agency may
use "constructed value" (estimated cost), to determine foreign market value.
If the administering agency
4 determines that the product in question is being
sold in the US at less than its foreign market value, the case is referred to the
International Trade Commission (ITC). The ITC then investigates whether
a domestic industry is being or is likely to be injured, or is prevented from being
established by reason of the importation of such merchandise.
Subsidy/Countervailing Duties
The idea behind a "countervailing duty" is to protect a country's producers
from having to compete with subsidized production abroad. To this effect, the
US countervailing duty law states that
Whenever any country... shall pay or bestow... any bounty or grant upon the manu-
facture or production or export of any article..., then upon the importation of such
article into the United States... there shall be levied... in addition to any duties
otherwise imposed, a duty equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant.. .
6
During the period covered by this study the US countervailing duty statute
prescribed an "injury test" only if the goods in question were duty-free.
8
Response to Foreign Action
In the most immediate sense, LFV actions, particularly countervailing duties,
are responses to policy actions taken by an exporting country. The purpose of
an LFV investigation is to determine whether the allegation of foreign export
subsidization or dumping is true. If so, the US response is automatic; if a for-
eign government subsidizes exports to the US, then the US Government im-
poses a countervailing duty equal to the subsidy.
When the political-economic process is viewed this way, it is the foreign
government's policy action which is the exogenous factor. Furthermore, the
effect of the countervailing duty is to offset the trade effect of the export sub-
sidy. If each foreign export subsidy is countervailed, the effect on trade (and
on the economy of the country which countervails) would be zero.
It is, however, arguable that the LFV laws, and particularly the administra-
tive rules which govern their implementation, proscribe actions in international
commerce which are allowed by the equivalent legislation governing domestic
trade practices.
7 If so, the LFV mechanisms neutralize or discourage actions by
foreigners selling in the US market, even though domestic sellers are not
prevented from taking such actions, and the mechanisms can reasonably be
described as protectionist"LESS THAN FAIR VALUE" 263
Dissatisfaction with the recent pattern of enforcement of the countervailing
duty and antidumping laws is evident. Domestic interests argued that the
Treasury Department had been overly sensitive to the interests of US im-
porters-consumers and to "internationalist" interests generally. This, in part,
was responsible for transferring the enforcement of these laws out of the
Treasury Department.
It is, however, not difficult to find the opposite opinions — that the LFV
laws and the associated administrative processes are being used to restrict im-
ports, and not simply to offset the trade-increasing effects of foreign actions.
For example, a recent article, "The Profits of Harassment," [18] listed 35
administrative complaints or court suits filed by US electronic appliance and
component manufacturers against Japanese competitors. It concluded that
"Even where actions do not succeed directly, they entail lengthy and costly
delays to Japanese market penetration, and the protectionist end result is often
achieved indirectly" [10, p. 74].
LFV Administration as Protection
A practical man would propose that whether or not LFV cases are more
than an offsetting response to foreign trade-increasing actions be answered in
the obvious way — by determining if the government imposes LFV duties (or
other trade restraints) when there is no trade-increasing foreign action more
or less often than it fails to respond to foreign trade-increasing actions, that is,
by comparing the facts of the cases with their legal outcomes. Practical as this
approach might be, it is, unfortunately, impossible. The purpose of the gov-
ernment's investigation of a petition is to determine the facts of the case, and
this is a time-consuming, expensive, and contentious process. Simply put, there
is no observation on the facts of a case other than its legal outcome. But be-
cause the antidumping and countervailing duty statutes allow either party to
an LFV petition to appeal the administering agency's decision to the federal
courts, there is incentive for the administering agency to get its facts straight
so as to avoid the embarrassment of having its decision overturned in court.
8
Possible Sources of Protectionist Bias in LFV Administration
Structural Bias
The infrequency with which LFV findings have been successfully challenged
in court suggests that any possible protectionist bias in the administration of the
LFV laws does not result from carelessness or dishonesty on the part of the
administering officials. There are, however, other possible sources of bias. If, as
is often asserted, producers who compete with imports are usually a more
identifiable, concentrated, and (therefore) vocal group than consumers, their
influence would be a factor swinging the net result toward protection.264 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
Such influence might effect itself in several ways. One possible avenue is
through the provision of information. Those individuals with a large stake in
the matter will be more strongly moved to make available information which
supports their case than will those whose stake is small. In addition, political
influence might affect the structure of the administering agency's decision
process. There are, of course, two alternative hypotheses, "Yes, dumping (or
a countervailable subsidy) is taking place," or "No, it is not," and the adminis-
tering agency has some discretion to structure its investigation so as to make
one or the other of these the "null" hypothesis, that is, the position to be taken
unless the available evidence is cause to reject it.
Harassment
The allegation that the process of LFV investigation serves as an import
barrier opens several questions. From the point of view of the foreign firm in-
terested in developing a market for its product in the US, the threat of an
LFV petition by its US competitors will
(1) Increase the cost of a project to develop a US market. Legal and ad-
ministrative expenses to respond to the LFV petition must be factored in.
(2) An additional element of risk is added to the project — the possibility
of an LFV petition and its anticipated outcome.
(3) The expected revenue the project will generate will be affected by the
anticipated outcome of the LFV investigation.
It is not immediately apparent that the cost increase will put the foreign firm
at a disadvantage relative to US firms. The latter will incur legal and adminis-
trative expenses in preparing and advancing their LFV petitions. There are,
however, more subtle ways in which this mutual increase of costs might be to
the advantage of domestic firms. First, imports account for much less than
half of sales in US markets, hence the foreign firm's additional expense will be
distributed over fewer units than will those of the US firms. Second, there may
be economies of scale or economies of learning-by-doing in filing and in re-
sponding to such petitions, and these economies are more likely to be captured
by a domestic firm or industry group which files petitions against exports from
several different countries than by firms or groups in each of the foreign
countries.
Two factors have a bearing on whether or not the threat of an LFV com-
plaint will change the expected revenue generated by a foreign firm's project
to develop a US market. Whether or not the foreign firm plans to dump and/
or benefit from an export subsidy is one factor, and the other is whether or not
the foreign firm views the LFV case decision process in the US as biased (in
the sense already discussed).
Suppose the foreign firm views the LFV decision process as unbiased —
it expects that LFV duties will just offset each export subsidy and each instance"LESS THAN FAIR VALUE" 265
of dumping. If the foreign firm's plan does not include dumping or the receipt
of an export subsidy, the possibility of an LFV complaint will not affect the
expected receipts the project will generate. That possibility will, however, add
to the riskiness of the project.
If the foreign firm views the LFV decision process as biased toward protec-
tionism, the LFV complaint factor will tend to reduce expected returns.
In sum, it is not necessary to assume that the LFV decision process is biased
in order to argue that the overall LFV complaint response-decision mechanism
tends to be protectionist. Per unit costs of filing and response to LFV complaints
are likely to be higher on imports than on domestic import replacements. Fur-
ther, the mechanism adds to the riskiness of the expected revenue to a foreign
firm from selling in the US market, and this would, other things being constant,
tend to reduce such sales.
Building a Case for Protection
Finally, the LFV mechanisms may be used by a domestic industry to build
a public case for protection. Filing an LFV petition is a more newsworthy event
than presenting evidence of import competition, and Congress is not likely
to act to protect an industry or to apply pressure on the administration to pro-
tect it unless all "ordinary" or "routine" means have been exhausted. In prac-
tice, administrative mechanisms are the "outer office" through which complaints
must pass if they are to gain access to the ultimate political authority behind
them.
THE INCIDENCE OF LFV CASES: THE DATA
The tabulation of LFV incidence covers the period January 1975 through
December 1979, and is based on tabulation prepared by the staff of the US
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations. These data cover the "life" of
of the Trade Act of 1974, which came into effect in January of 1979 and was
superseded by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 in January of 1980.
Data
The data on LFV cases are summarized in Tables 1, 2, and 3. In constructing
these tables, we began with the STR listing, which included some 230 cases, 111
countervailing duty cases, and 119 antidumping cases. We then determined
the 1976 import value coverage of each case. This includes only imports of the
products (defined at the TSUSA 7-digit level of detail) and from the country
or countries named in the petition.
0
The data in Table 2 are aggregates of the "case" data into 2-digit SIC cate-
gories, combined with SIC-based import data. These tables present two mea-
sures of "LFV incidence," the percentage of imports covered by all affirmative
cases, and the percentage of imports covered by all cases — which includes af-266 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
SECTOR INCIDENCE OF ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES CASES COMBINED (January 1975-December 1979)




















































Lumber and wood products
Furniture and fixtures
Paper and allied products
Printing and allied products






















































































































































































































































firmative, pending, and negative or terminated cases. These series will be called
the "LFV affirmative cases incidence," and the "LFV complaints incidence,"
respectively.
While these incidence figures are intended as general measures of the "pro-
tectionist" impact of the LFV cases, care should be taken in interpreting them.
The complaints measure includes cases which were denied or withdrawn. Even
so, the filing of some such petitions and their investigation may have imposed
costs on foreign exporters or otherwise tended to retard imports, or may have
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Tablei 3





































































































































































































































































































In a number of cases, the initially imposed LFV penalty duties have since
been lifted, and the case has been moved into the "negative and/or terminated"
section of the STR listing. We, however, classified cases by their initial out-
come, since this was the better measure of the advantage the LFV mechanism
gave the domestic petitioner over the foreign seller. Often LFV penalties are
suspended only after the foreign sellers (or government) has agreed to dis-
continue the pricing practice which led to the LFV petition.
Incidence Pattern
As the data reported have not been previously available, they are shown in
some detail. Table 1 presents, by 2-digit SIC category, incidence measures of
the combined incidence of antidumping and countervailing duty cases. Table"LESS THAN FAIR VALUE" 269
2 compares, for all manufactured goods, the incidences of the LFV cases on
major country groups — developed, developing, and Latin-American countries.
Among the major characteristics of the incidence patterns are the following:
— During the period covered, LFV petitions (dumping and countervailing
duty combined) were filed against Ve of all US imports, and Vi of manufactured
imports.
— Over half of the imports against which LFV petitions were filed were in
one industry, automobiles. With automobiles excluded, LFV petitions covered
%2 oi total imports and ^4 °f manufactured imports.
— Virtually all of the petitions involved manufactured goods.
— Within manufacturing, $15 million of the $19 million of imports covered
by LFV petitions were in two industries, steel and automobiles.
— Dumping cases covered more than twice the value of imports covered by
countervailing duty cases but the difference is more than accounted for by one
industry, automobiles.
— The incidence of complaints was only one-eighth as high against imports
from developing countries as against imports from developed countries.
— The incidences of LFV complaints against imports from LDGs and
against imports from DCs have different sectorial patterns — for imports from
LDCs the LFV complaint incidence is highest in the textiles, rubber and
plastics products, and leather products sectors, while the incidence of LFV
complaints against imports from DCs is concentrated on steel and steel prod-
ucts, electronic machinery, automobiles, and food products.
— Over the January 1975-December 1979 period covered, LFV complaints
were filed against 30 countries, of which 18 were developed. Affirmative deter-
minations were made concerning imports from 15 developed and from 7 devel-
oping countries.
— Complaints were filed against only 0.8 percent of manufactured imports
from Latin-American countries.
— The incidence of affirmative cases was higher against developing than
against developed countries. Of manufactured imports, 2.4 percent from LDCs
and 1.7 percent from DCs were subject to affirmative LFV findings over the
period.
— Against manufactured imports from Latin-American countries, the inci-
dence of affirmative findings was 0.4 percent, considerably lower than the inci-
dence against developed countries.
REGRESSION ANALYSIS
This section presents the results of statistical analyses of the industry inci-
dences of LFV complaints, and of the LFV affirmative cases. The data for this




EXPLANATION OF LESS THAN FAIR VALUE COMPLAINTS INCIDENCE SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS
OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES IN MULTIPLE REGRESSION EQUATIONS
Independent variable
































































01, 05, 10 designated significance at the 99 percent, 95 percent, and 90 percent confi-
dence levels, respectively. N designates not significant at the 90 percent confidence
level.
The first value given in each column is the value of R-Bar squared and the second is the
significance level.
Questions Posed
If the "harassment thesis" is true, the relationship between LFV complaints
and import competition is a two-way relationship. On the one hand, the more
intense is import competition, the more one would expect domestic firms and
industries to file LFV complaints. But if such complaints tend to impose larger
costs and uncertainties on foreigners who sell in the US market than on the
local firms who file the complaints, there will be a simultaneous negative rela-
tion between import growth and LFV complaints. Thus, the regression analysis
reported in Table 4 is aimed at the question, "What is behind the pattern of
LFV complaints, and what are the effects of these complaints?" The ordinary-
least-squares analysis reported here amounts to a look at a reduced form
combination of both questions, but the pattern of results is nevertheless re-
vealing. (A more detailed attempt to identify the effect of LFV complaints on
import growth is presented in Table 5.)
Table 6 presents results of an ordinary-least-squares regression analysis of the
LFV affirmative cases index. In this instance the questions at hand are "What
is behind the pattern of foreign LFV pricing, what are its effects, and the
effects of the LFV penalties which result from the affirmative cases?" It is
not possible to clarify all these questions from the results of one reduced form
regression equation, but answers are suggested for several important aspects of
the general issues."LESS THAN FAIR VALUE" 271
EXPLANATION OF INDUSTRY IMPORT GROWTH RATE, 1974-77 SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS



































































01, 05, 10 designated significance at the 99 percent, 95 percent, and 90 percent confidence levels,
respectively. N designates not significant at the 90 percent confidence level.
See text for explanation.
Table 6
EXPLANATION OF LESS THAN FAIR VALUE AFFIRMATIVE CASES INCIDENCE SIGNIFICANCE
LEVELS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES IN MULTIPLE REGRESSION EQUATIONS

























































a01, 05, 10 designated significance at the 99 percent, 95 percent, and 90 percent
confidence levels, respectively. N designates not significant at the 90 percent
confidence level.
The first value given in each column is the value of R-Bar squared and the second
is the significance level.272 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
Data sources for and exact definitions of explanatory variables included in the
analysis are given in the Appendix.
LFV Complaints Index
Table 4 indicates that the LFV complaints index is related to two major fac-
tors: (1) the degree of import penetration (imports/domestic shipments) ; and
(2) the size of the industry, that is, the potential payoff from complaining,
in terms of annual output or of assets protected. The size of the physical capital
stock and value of shipments (not included in the table) are both significantly
correlated with the LFV complaints index. Among measures of import com-
petition, the import penetration ratio is significantly correlated with the LFV
complaints index, but the import growth rate is not.
The negative sign on the growth rate of domestic shipments is what one
would expect — the better an industry is doing the less likely it is that it will
petition for protection.
The observed positive relation between LFV complaints and tariff rates
suggests that industries which have filed petitions for import relief through
the LFV mechanisms have also applied pressure to prevent their tariff rates
from being negotiated away at the GATT rounds. (Using effective rates of
protection produces the same result.)
LFV Affirmative Cases Index
We began our approach to the question of what lies behind the coverage of
LFV affirmative findings by looking at the determinants of US comparative
advantage, measured by the US share, in 1976, of OECD countries' exports. The
list of statistically significant factors included labor intensity, physical capital
intensity (both negatively related), human capital intensity (positively related),
and two "product cycle" variables, Hufbauer's measure of product differentia-
tion, and a previously developed measure of the rate of development of new
products. Of these, only the degree of product differentiation is significantly
related to the LFV affirmative cases index. Possible interpretations of the corre-
lation results, presented in Table 6, will be discussed along with the analysis of
the effects of LFV cases on import growth.
Complaints and Affirmative Case Indexes as Determinants of Import Growth Rates
The negative correlations observed in Tables 4 and 6 between import growth
and the incidences of both LFV complaints and of LFV affirmative cases sug-
gest that the observed relation is the effect of LFV cases on import growth
rather than the effect of import growth on LFV cases. This information sug-
gests a model along the following lines. Letting C and A represent the LFV
complaints and affirmative cases indexes, and G the import growth rate, the
equations of the model would be"LESS THAN FAIR VALUE" 273
(1) C-=f{G,MP,K,L).
(2) A = h{C,MP,PD,V).
(3) G = g{C,A,SG,F).
The first equation states that complaints arise from import growth and other
(exogenous) factors, the second that the incidence of affirmative findings is
influenced by the incidence of complaints, and the third that the growth rate of
imports is influenced by complaints and by affirmative findings, plus exogenous
factors. Analysis reports in Table 4 indicate that the exogenous factors which
should be included in Equation (1) are the import penetration ratio (MP), the
size of the physical capital stock (K), and the labor employment level (L).
Exogenous factors which apparently influence the affirmative findings index
A, include import penetration, the degree of product differentiation (PD), and
the size of the industry, as measured by the value of domestic shipments (V).
Finally, the exogenous variables included as determinants of the import growth
rate include the rate of growth of domestic shipments (SG) and the sort of
"factor proportions" variables which trade theory suggests will influence the
industry pattern of US comparative advantage.
A previous analysis of the import position of US industries [7] suggested the
list of exogenous factors used in the equation for the import growth rate. In-
cluded were the growth rate of domestic shipments, to reflect relative rates of
expansion of demand, and three "product cycle" variables. Among these, the
rate of product turnover reflects conceptually the intensity of competition by
product development, and was quantified by tabulating the number of 7-digit
items which appeared, disappeared, or changed definition in each 3-digit SITC
category in the US export schedule (see [7] for details). The negative sign on
this term reflects the basic product cycle proposition that close contact with the
market is important in those industries in which competition for market share
takes the form of offering a newer, more attractive product variety rather than
the form of offering a lower price on a standardized product.
As an independent variable in this equation, the value of domestic ship-
ments represents the size of the market, which, to a foreign supplier, is an indi-
cator of potential economies of scale in production and in market development.
The consumer goods ratio measures the percentage of industry output pur-
chased for final consumption rather than for use as inputs in other industries,
and is based on the 1972 US input-output table. The positive sign on this term
reflects the growing internationalization of US markets for consumer goods.
Model A
Results in the first three columns (labeled Model A) of Table 5 are three
versions of the second-stage equation in the simultaneous model already de-
scribed. The first-stage, reduced form equations for C and A are not shown,
but are very similar to the equations shown in Tables 4 and 6.274 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
These findings indicate, as the harassment thesis asserts, that there is a
significant, negative impact of LFV complaints on import growth rates. The
magnitude of this parameter is approximately —0.2, indicating that a 1 per-
centage point increase of the LFV complaint index brings approximately a 0.2
percentage point reduction of the industry import growth rate.
A somewhat surprising finding is the insignificant relationship between the
LFV affirmative cases index and the import growth rate. A possible explanation
is that the LFV penalties (antidumping, countervailing duties) imposed in
affirmative cases just offset (as is intended) the trade effects of the pricing
actions which trigger these penalties. Thus, with the trade effects of LFV pric-
ing and of LFV penalties just offsetting each other, there remains only the back-
ground, or factor proportions determinants of import growth.
Another interesting result is that although complaints and affirmative findings
move in strongly parallel tracks (their correlation in Table 6 is highly signifi-
cant), when structural Equation (2) is estimated by two-stage least-squares, the
complaints index is not a significant determinant of the affirmative cases index.
(This result is not shown in the tables.) Why, if the incidence of complaints
has no influence on the incidence of affirmative findings, do they track so
closely? Perhaps import penetration, as an indicator of injury, is the key to the
explanation. Import penetration triggers complaints (as shown in Table 4),
and the decision mechanism tends to produce affirmative findings when the
levels of import penetration is high.
Thus the ordinary-least-squares results might be a false indicator of the power
of political pressure to achieve an affirmative LFV decision. These results (in
Table 6) suggest that the LFV decision mechanism responds to pressure — the
higher the intensity of complaints, the higher the intensity of affirmative findings.
But the two-stage result suggests that the LFV decision process is more ob-
jective. Import penetration affects both the level of complaints and of affirma-
tive findings, and when this colinear result is adjusted for, there appears to be
no causal link between the intensities of complaints and of affirmative findings.
The LFV decision process may have been more objective than the ordinary-
least-squares results would suggest.
Model B
Because these results suggest that C might not be a significant variable in
Equation (2), an alternative model of the simultaneous relationship between
C and A was examined. This model is composed of Equations (1) and (3)
already given — the equation for A being eliminated, and A treated as an exo-
genous element in the equation for import growth. As the results in columns 4,
5, and 6 of Table 5 indicate, this does not change the findings as to the deter-
minants of import growth. Correlation between the fitted values of the LFV
complaint index and the import growth rates indicate again that the harass-"LESS THAN FAIR VALUE" 275
ment thesis is valid. When the observed values of the affirmative cases index
are introduced as an explanatory variable along with the fitted values of the
complaints index, and it is found again that affirmative findings is not sig-
nificantly correlated with import growth.
FURTHER IMPLICATIONS AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
Concentration and Size
One of the more frequently encountered hypotheses is that concentrated in-
terests will have a louder and more influential voice than diffused interests. This
idea is usually encountered as an explanation for the relative strengths of
producer and consumer interests, but it also suggests that a firm in an uncon-
centrated industry might be reluctant to finance an LFV petition, whose benefits
would mostly spill over to other firms. As a test of this hypothesis, we found
that the industry concentration ratio is positively, but not significantly related
to the LFV complaints index. The stronger correlations on measures of in-
dustry size indicate that it is the size, not the concentration of the potential
gain which is a determining factor.
1
1
The correlation between industry concentration and the LFV affirmative
cases index is negative, and hence inconsistent with the hypothesis that con-
centrated economic interests have a more pronounced impact than diffused
ones.
Comparing results in Tables 4 and 6, we see that while LFV complaints are
positively related to industry size (measured by capital stock or by annual ship-
ments), the LFV affirmative cases index is negatively related to measures of
industry size. Keeping in mind that an LFV complaint will not lead to an
affirmative finding if an alternative political remedy is provided, this observation
is consistent with the hypothesis that the trade problems of big industries will
be worked out through a more political mechanism than the technical LFV
complaint-response-decision procedure. Political influence may not get one an
affirmative finding from the LFV technocrats as much as it gets one access to
more political mechanisms.
An alternative interpretation is that in large cases, where much is at stake,
groups of users or consumers find it in their interest to organize to resist the
protectionist pressures of the domestic producers who have filed LFV petitions
for protection. Thus the larger the case, the more likely it may be that the out-
come will be a political standoff, with no clear outcome at either a technical or
a political level.
Discrimination Against Consumers
A possible explanation for the absence of correlation between industry con-
centration and the LFV complaints and LFV affirmative cases indexes is that
many industries sell their output to other industries, with offsetting political276 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
influence. If, as is often surmised, producer interests are more powerful than
consumer interests, one might expect the LFV indexes to be relatively high
in industries which produce consumer goods. We found no such relation.
Against the LFV complaints and the LFV affirmative cases index, the t-statistics
on the consumer goods ratio (as an independent variable) are virtually zero.
A possible explanation is that the rise of consumer groups has provided a coun-
tervailing influence against producer groups, but whatever the explanation, the
data reveal no tendency for the LFV mechanism to come down harder on
consumer goods than on other industries.
Political Dependency
An extreme version of the dependency thesis might suggest that in trade dis-
putes such as LFV cases the US "enjoys such an overall disparity of interna-
tional power and relative invulnerability that it is able to achieve its objectives
in virtually every case."
1
2 If every complaint against LDC exporters was vir-
tually assured of success, and those against exporters of politically more power-
ful countries were more risky, the incidence of LFV complaints and of LFV
affirmative decisions should be higher.
While Table 2 shows that the incidence of LFV complaints against LDCs is
much lower than against DCs, it also shows that the incidence of affirmative
findings is slightly higher against LDCs.
1
3 These data neither constitute strong
evidence in support of the dependency thesis, nor are they clear grounds for
rejecting it.
CONCLUSIONS
Less than fair value cases arise when a buyer in the US finds it to his ad-
vantage to purchase from a foreign rather than from a domestic source. From
the point of view of the US political structure, the major actors in an LFV
case or in any issue concerning protection from foreign competition are the
conflicting domestic interests. Thus exporting countries can exercise only
minimal influence on the incidence of LFV complaints.
1
4
The current US countervailing duty and antidumping laws are not the ones
which were in effect for the period covered by the data, and the administration
of these laws has been shifted from the US Treasury Department to the US
Department of Commerce. The effects these changes will have on the inci-
dence and effects of LFV cases is a better topic for debate than for analysis.
Newspaper stories report a widespread concern that these changes may repre-
sent an overall shift toward domestic interests. Analysis has shown, however,
that the LFV mechanisms have, in the past, responded primarily to domestic
interests, and hence such a shift is not necessarily a shift toward protectionism.
There will likely be a bulge in 1980 in the number of LFV petitions filed,
but old hands at this business report that such a bulge follows every change of
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APPENDIX
Data Sources and Definitions of Explanatory Variables
Physical capital, human capital, and labor intensity. Measures of these vari-
ables are based on data from the US Bureau of the Census, US Census of
Manufactures and Annual Survey of Manufactures. Conversion from 4-digit
SIC to 3-digit SITC followed Hufbauer's concordance [19, Table A-l] updated
to 1975. We then followed Branson and Monoyious [2] in calculating variables.
Data from which we calculated the consumer goods ratio were taken from
the 85-sector version of the 1972 US input-output tables [16] and were trans-
ferred into SITC categories by our "home-made" concordance. The consumer
goods ratio, by sector, is defined as the ratio of personal consumption expendi-
tures to "domestic supply," that is, total commodity output plus imports minus
exports. As measured, it is a "direct," not a "total," coefficient.
The "product differentiation" series was taken from Hufbauer's Table A-2
[11]. Empirically, it is the coefficient of variation in unit values of 1965 US
exports destined to different countries, aggregated from the seven- to the three-
digit level using simple averages.
NOTES
1. While the conclusions of these studies are more impressionistic than precise,
informed opinion at the moment [1 and 15] seems to be that protection is not in-
creasing rapidly — at least not as rapidly as was feared several years ago. World
trade in manufactured goods continues to increase relative to output, and while such
figures do not exclude the possibility that protection is increasing, they do indicate
that the trade-destroying forces at play are outweighed by the trade-creating forces.
2. It is tempting for an economist working on such a subject to "read the law,"
and spend much time "discovering" concepts (implicit in the law journals) which are
most likely covered in the first week of law school. Having, with some effort, just
loosened myself from that tarbaby, I may have moved farther toward a strictly eco-
nomic point of view than is optimal.
3. Antidumping Act, 1921, as Amended (19 U.S.C. 160-178).
4. Beginning January 1980, the Department of Commerce. Before then the act
was enforced by the Treasury Department.
5. 19 U.S.C. 1303.
6. The absence of an injury provision predates the GATT. Because of the "grand-
father rights," preserved by the US in its accession to the GATT, the US law was
not in violation of the subsequently conceived GATT standard. The Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979 had added an injury test, but it will be applicable only in cases
involving countries which are signatories to the New Agreement Relating to Sub-
sidies and Countervailing Measures.
7. William L. Dickey [4 and 5] argues this point.
8. According to Treasury Department officials familiar with these matters, such
appeals have been infrequent, and have almost always been challenges to the Trea-
sury Department's interpretation of the law rather than challenges to the facts or
evidence on which the Treasury Department based its decision. The Zenith case, for
example, challenged the Treasury Department's longstanding policy of not considering
the rebate on exported goods of a direct tax as a countervailable action.278 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
9. The STR list provided the 7-digit Tariff Schedule of the US Annotated (TSUSA)
category or categories for about half of the cases. For each other case we contacted
the Customs Bureau personnel who had investigated the case, and with them worked
out the TSUSA coverage of the case. For cases filed in 1976 and defined in terms of
the 1976 TSUSA, the import figures were taken directly from 1976 TSUSA-by-
country-of-origin data tapes. For cases filed in other years the "filing year" value of
imports was discounted backward or forward to 1976, using the 1970-77 annual
growth rate of imports of the corresponding 4-digit SITC category from the affected
country or countries. Data availability dictated this approach.
10. The numerator for this series was obtained by re-summing the "case data"
(described in the section entitled "The Incidence of LFV Cases") into SITC cate-
gories, while the denominator (all, that is, LFV plus non-LFV imports) were ob-
tained from OECD Series C as maintained in the Data Resources, Inc. computerized
data file. SITC rather than SIC categories were chosen because our "industry char-
acteristics" data base already existed in SITC terms.
11. Thirty percent of the antidumping and 65 percent of the countervailing duty
complaints tabulated were filed by industry groups (producer groups or labor unions)
or by individuals of government agencies on behalf of the entire industry. The logic
behind the concentration, political influence hypothesis suggests that industry groups
should be more cohesive and effective in concentrated industries, and hence whether
petitions are filed by firms or by industry groups the concentration, political influence
relationship "should" hold.
12. John S. Odell [14, p. 8]. Odell is summarizing this position as a hypothesis to
be tested, not advocating its validity.
13. As already discussed, we have classified a case as affirmative if the initial US
government decision was affirmative, whereas the "STR list" would describe a case
as negative if the LFV penalties have subsequently been suspended. Had we followed
STR's convention, affirmative cases would cover slightly less than 1 percent of manu-
factured imports from LDCs, and the incidence against DC would be the same as
reported in Table 2. In other words, whether or not the affirmative case incidence is
higher on imports from LDCs or on imports from DCs depends on whether one
follows STRs or our convention for designating a case as affirmative.
14. Obviously, the avoidance of pricing practices which by US law trigger LFV
penalties will reduce the incidence of LFV complaints. A legal-economic explanation
of import pricing practices proscribed by US law is given by Dickey [8].
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